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Determining Cropland Cash
Rental Arrangements
Kevin C. Dhuyvetter, Terry L. Kastens and Joe L. Outlaw*
Many crop producers rely heavily on rented land in their farming operations.
Crop land is typically rented in one of three ways: (1) cash rent; (2) crop share; or
(3) cash/share combination. While crop share leases have been the most common
method of renting land, interest in cash rents is increasing. Reasons include: 1)
increased planting flexibility; 2) landowners not wanting to share the increased
expenses of new tillage/cropping systems or production technologies; 3) older
landowners wanting fixed income; 4) increased farm size and number of landown-
ers per tenant; and 5) difficulty in prorating long-term capital investments in cer-
tain technologies (e.g., precision agriculture).
The rental arrangements between landowners and producers can significantly
affect risk and profitability, and producers should understand those effects. For
example, one study found that where cash renting is more common, land tends to
change hands more often than where land is rented on a crop share basis.
This publication describes cash rent leases and compares them to crop share
arrangements. For more information on crop share rental see RM 5-13.0,
Determining Cropland Share Rental Arrangements.
Determining Cash Rent Rates
Landowners and tenants often request help in determining rental rates.
Economic theory says that an equilibrium rate occurs where the supply of land
equals the demand for land. How do we arrive at an equilibrium price? Typically,
landowners and tenants negotiate to find a cash lease rate that is “fair” to both
parties.
In areas where there is sufficient cash renting, the prevailing cash rent market
price will help determine the “fair” rent. However, in some areas there is no
established rental rate, or, if there is one, the rate is based on extenuating circum-
stances that make it inappropriate as a guideline (e.g., rate includes buildings or
machinery, rent is between family members). In these cases, the rate negotiation
may begin with factors such as the landowner’s cost, the amount the ten-
ant can afford to pay, and/or the crop share adjusted for risk
(Langemeier).
Landowner’s cost refers to the opportunity cost of land
investment, less expected capital gains, plus real estate tax.
The idea is that a landowner expects some net rate of return
on his investment in the land. This net rate of return can be
approximated by the historical average rent-to-value ratio. The
cash rent would be calculated by multiplying the rent-to-value
ratio by the market value of the land.  
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The “amount a tenant can afford to pay”
method of establishing cash rents says that the
tenant receives all income and pays all expenses
and whatever is left is available for cash rent to
the landowner. In practice, landowner’s cost and
amount a tenant can afford to pay often repre-
sent lower and upper bounds, respectively, to
the rent negotiation process. But, if individual
land ownership and tenant profitability values
are used, rather than averages, it may be that
the “amount a tenant can afford” is actually less
than land ownership costs. Nonetheless, these
values help establish a framework within which
to begin rent negotiation.
Because many landowners and tenants are
familiar with crop share arrangements, using a
crop share approach to determine a cash rental
rate is practical. This approach determines the
cash equivalent amount of an equitable crop
share arrangement and then often makes a risk
adjustment to that value. The reason for making
the risk adjustment is that with cash rent all of
the production and price risk falls on the pro-
ducer, whereas with crop share this risk is
shared between the producer and the land-
owner. 
Risk-return Tradeoff
With any type of investment, increased
returns generally are associated with increased
risk (Fig. 1). To realize higher average returns
(x), a person must be willing to take on more
risk (sx). Similarly, a person desiring less risk
will need to accept lower returns. Putting this in
the crop share and cash rent framework, it
seems reasonable that a landowner would be
willing to accept lower returns with cash rent
than with crop share because of the lower risk
(e.g., move from point A to point B). Likewise,
because of the increased risk associated with
cash rent, a producer would want a higher
return than with crop share (e.g., move from
point B to point A). That means paying less with
cash rent than with share rent. How much
lower the cash rent might be will depend pri-
marily upon the relative risk of the two options.
Producers should consider how much the
variability in income (risk) might increase with
cash renting compared to crop share renting.
Comparing Tenant’s Income from Crop
Share vs. Cash Rent
To examine income variability from renting
on a cash versus a crop share basis, 1987-1996
yield information was collected for farms in the
north central (NC), southeast (SE), and south-
west (SW) Kansas Farm Management
Associations. Only farms having yields for
wheat, milo and soybeans for each year were
considered for NC and SE and only farms hav-
ing wheat and irrigated corn yields each year
were considered for SW. The number of farms
considered were 24, 65 and 14 for NC, SE and
SW, respectively. Representative farms were
developed based on the average number of acres
for all the farms considered.  The representative
farms had the following crops and acres: 
NC — wheat (460), milo (211) and 
soybeans (141)
SE — wheat (328), milo (243) and 
soybeans (374)
SW — wheat (548), fallow (548) and 
irrigated corn (388)
Given the acreage mix of the representative
farms and the actual yields of all farms consid-
ered, net income was calculated for each farm
for each year using average county prices, an
average government payment, and 1997 costs
for the region (KSU Farm Management and
Marketing Handbook). Because yields increase
over time and this analysis is based on 1987-
1996 actual yields, average returns over the 10-
year period were normalized to zero by adjust-
ing yields up proportionally (increase of approxi-
mately 10 percent in all regions). This normal-
ization of returns is also consistent with the gen-
eral assumption that average profits equal zero
in the long run.  
Equitable crop share arrangements were cal-
culated and compared to those typical in the
region (Lanagemeier, Albright and DeLano). The
equitable crop share arrangements determined
were 1/3 to 2/3 with the landowner sharing fertil-
izer, insecticide, irrigation, energy and  herbicide
costs on spring crops and the tenant paying all
other operating expenses.
The tenant’s returns were calculated for each
year with the following rental arrangements:
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Figure 1.
(1) typical crop share; (2) cash rent equivalent;
and (3) crop share with no shared inputs. The
first method was the 1/3 to 2/3 arrangement dis-
cussed above. The second method was a fixed
cash rent equivalent to the average net crop
share returns of the landowner (landowner’s 1/3
share of income less landowner’s shared expens-
es). No risk adjustment was considered, as that
would affect average returns but not income
variability and so is not relevant for this analy-
sis. The third method was an equitable arrange-
ment where no inputs are shared by the
landowner. With this method the tenant’s share
of the income was 73.5, 74.8 and 77.9 percent
for NC, SE and SW, respectively. This third
method was considered because it represents an
arrangement that shares risk but allows
landowners not to share associated  input costs.  
The analysis assumes that all acres are rented
and that the producer does not make any
changes in production (acres or costs) as the
rental arrangement changes. Figure 2 shows the
annual profit per acre to the tenant of one of the
individual farms in NC Kansas for each of the
three rental arrangements considered. The annu-
al variability of profit is considerably greater
with the cash rent than with either of the crop
share rental arrangements; average profits are
equal for all methods. As expected, the producer
is better off with a cash rent in the good years
but would prefer a crop share arrangement in
the bad years. There were similar patterns  for
the farms in SE and SW Kansas. 
The average variability of producer profit for
the different rental arrangements for the differ-
ent regions is shown in Fig. 3. In all regions,
variability, as measured by the standard devia-
tion of income, increased about 50 percent by
going from an equitable crop share arrangement
sharing some inputs to a cash rent. This indi-
cates that the risk to producers is substantially
greater with a cash rent than with the “typical”
crop share arrangement. The way to interpret a
standard deviation is as follows: returns would
be expected to fall in the range of the average
(mean) plus or minus one standard deviation 68
percent of the time, and between the mean +/-
two standard deviations 95 percent of the time.
For example, in the NC region we would expect
returns from a typical crop share arrangement to
fall between -$32.7 and +$32.7 68 percent of
the time, compared to -$49 and +$49 with a
cash rent (the mean is zero for both methods
because returns were normalized).
If producers switched to an equitable crop
share arrangement with the landowners sharing
no expenses (share #2), income variability
increased only 10 to 17 percent. Thus, if a
landowner does not want to pay bills associated
with the typical crop share arrangements, the
producer may want to consider alternative crop
share arrangements as opposed to switching to
cash rents, unless there is an adequate “risk pre-
mium” factored into the cash rent.
Risk Premium
A risk premium, or risk adjustment, repre-
sents a reduction in the cash rent relative to
what is expected from a crop share arrange-
ment, to account for the shift in risk from the
landowner to the tenant. The amount of the risk
adjustment is a function of an individual’s aver-
sion to risk as well as the income variability.
Since an individual’s aversion to risk is difficult
to quantify, a recommended risk premium can-
not be calculated. In Kansas, a risk adjustment
of 5 to 10 percent is considered reasonable.
It should be pointed out that risk premiums
may not always be observed (i.e., cash rents
might be equal to or greater than crop share
cash equivalents). This might be the case if
there is concern about the producer’s environ-
mental stewardship, if the lease is short-term, or
if the producer is not typical in some way. If a
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landowner is concerned that a tenant will not
maintain the quality of land with regard to fer-
tility or weed control, the landowner may
require a cash rent above what would be expect-
ed from a crop share arrangement. Producers
wishing to spread fixed machinery and labor
costs over more acres may bid cash rents up
above an equilibrium long-term rate. However,
because fixed costs will need to be paid in the
long run, these higher cash rents can not be sus-
tained over long periods of time. Producers with
above average production abilities (i.e., higher
yields) or cost efficiencies (i.e., lower costs) may
bid cash rents up relative to what the average
producer can pay over the long run. Thus, there
are legitimate reasons why cash rent risk premi-
ums may not be observed in all cases. However,
the reasons listed are exceptions and do not nec-
essarily represent what we expect to observe in
the long run.
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